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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : GER - Mr. G. W. Lewis

DATE: October 19, 1951.

FROM : GER - George G. Spencer

SUBJECT:

There is attached a copy of a memorandum, in draft form, which IAD proposes to send to Mr. Byroade, provided that we have no serious objections. The memorandum is expected to be signed by Park Armstrong, who is understood to favor this approach as a result of conversations which he has had with Koepfli.

Some time early next week I would like to discuss the attached with you, together with a recent message we have received from Nordstrom on a subject related to this problem. I have provided Miller (GEA) and Ropshaw (GPA) with copies of the attached in the event they may have a comment to make early next week.

Enclosure:

Draft memo.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
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TO: GER - Mr. Dyroade

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Respecting German Science

Problem. To develop a national policy with respect to German science and technology, and to establish a general framework within which agencies of the government can carry on programs and relationships with German science and scientists.

Discussion. At the present time there are, at least U. S. Government programs in existence involving German science, as follows:

- (a). The control activity conducted by Scientific Research Division, Military Security Board, HICOG.
- (b). The scientific encouragement function evolved by the Scientific Research Division, as an outgrowth of the necessarily intimate contact with German scientists resulting from (a) above.
- (c). The program of scientific cooperation laid down in the Berkner report "Science and Foreign Relations", carried on by the Department's Science Advisor (U/SA).
- (d). Soviet Air technical intelligence program, carried on by the Department of the Air Force, looking to the undertaking by German scientists, or research in aeronautical and related fields.
- (e). "Project 63" conducted by Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, under authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program, is apparently a continuation and elaboration of "Paperclip", and envisages bringing selected German scientists to the US under a contract arrangement for work in US research institutions.
- (f). JIOA "denial" program, intended to discourage the exodus of

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German scientists to the Soviet orbit either by physical controls (denial of exit permits, etc.) or by encouragement to continue their work in areas outside the Soviet orbit.

(g). Scientific intelligence collection activities carried on by NICOG, CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force in Germany with the following objectives:

(1) Collecting data on scientific and technical developments in Western Germany.

(2) Collecting data on scientific and technical developments in the Soviet orbit through West German scientists with contacts in the Soviet area.

(3) Encouraging the return or defection of scientists from the Soviet orbit who are potential sources of information.

In addition to the above programs directly involving German science, there are other programs and policies which indirectly but definitely affect German scientists and technicians:

(a). The programs for rehabilitating and strengthening the German economy must take into account the vital role and potential contribution of German science and technology. ECA and counterpart funds have been expended on restoration or modernization of laboratories and research facilities.

(b). The USIE program as applied to Germany has resulted in sponsored visits or studies by German scientists in the US.

There is evidence that other agencies of the Government, e.g. the Bureau of Mines, are engaged in activities which include the recruitment or use of German scientists. A number of US industrial firms also

recruit

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recruit or on contract or other basis German scientists and technicians.

Each of the above programs and activities, taken by itself, is logical, justifiable, and probably worthwhile. However, in their impact on Germany and on Germans, they are contradictory, inconsistent, and conflicting. The implementation of "Project 63" provides a vivid illustration of this fact, in that JIOA attempted to recruit certain scientists who were currently being used by intelligence as sources of information on the Soviet orbit, and others whose research in Germany was being encouraged by SRD or who were indirectly recipients of ECA and similar aid. The fact that "Project 63" was implemented in a manner reminiscent of 1945 rather than of 1951 increased the resentment and perplexity aroused both in Germans and in representatives of other US agencies in Germany. It is clear that a repetition of this incident should not be permitted.

The U.S. Government agencies directly concerned with German science include the following: State, ECA, CIA, Defence, Army, Navy and Air Force. If a common policy is to be established binding on all these agencies, it must be sought at the NSC or comparable level. Inter-agency negotiation, in Washington and in the field, can only result in the ad hoc solution of critical problems as they arise, as for example, "Project 63".

The necessity of acting in concert with the British and French in this, as in other matters, and the fact that any US Government policy in this field must be in harmony with the basic principles which may be established to govern US relationships with Germany, seem to be overriding considerations in arriving at a US Government policy regarding German science.

Conclusions.

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Conclusions.

- (a) It is urgently necessary to develop an overall Governmental policy with respect to German science, within which agencies can conduct their normal business with German scientists and scientific activities.
- (b) Such a policy can only be arrived at on the NSC level.

Recommendations.

- (a) That GER assume the action responsibility for bringing this problem to the NSC and for recommending appropriate policy statements for NSC consideration.

Concurrences. CIA and U/SA concur in the above recommendations. They, as well as R, are prepared to give GER all possible assistance in this matter.